On the second night Gretchen makes several point which effectively prove that B* being psychologically continuous with A* is not the same as being the same exact person. In the three nights, Miller and Cohen set out to show Gretchen that it is possible that she will survive the death of her material body. To do this, they must prove that the being of Gretchen is not trapped with her body, but rather with her soul, or memories, or brain. All of these arguments are presented in an attempt to sway Gretchen away from the body criterion of identity, but the second night focuses on memories and psychological continuity. She successfully counters the ideas of Cohen and Miller on this night, demonstrating that psychological continuity does not equate to identity.
The weaker argument of the second night is an unsuccessful attempt at demonstrating the relationship between memory and identity. The second night opens with Miller bringing up the idea that when you wake up in the morning, you know who you are without the assistance of an image of your body. It is not necessary for you to even open your eyes, as you can figure out who you are based off of memory. From this, we can deduce that A* and B* are the same person if B* remembers A*. The different stages of a person life are then connected by memory, or by being part of a continuous stream of consciousness. A person may not remember what they did forty days ago, but they certainly remember what they did yesterday. Their yesterday self then remembers the previous day quite well and so on, until we reach forty days in the past. These memories would then connect different points in a person’s life, and therefore connect the identity of the person. To illustrate this, Miller addresses an example of a river, which as a whole has a specific name, but constantly has different water flowing through it. This river can always be acknowledged as a certain name because the water all connects to each other. In other words, the water that flows through the river currently relates to the water seen yesterday because it is connected to water which is eventually connected to the water you witnessed in the past. While these arguments seem strong and well stated, Gretchen swiftly disproves them by citing the difference between remembering something and seeming to remember something. There are several instances in our world where a person believes that they remember a specific event, but they could not actually remember that event because it never occurred to them. A hypnotist show is one instance where this could happen, as volunteers at these shows believe they are different people than they actually are, such as a small child or a world leader. Merely remembering yourself as a world leader is not sufficient to make yourself a world leader, and according to Gretchen, a memory itself is not enough to determine identity. She is undoubtable correct, considering the many instances of people who remember events which did not happen to them, and therefore could not possibly make up their identity. This argument is the weaker one of the night, considering it is successfully refuted in a way everyone acknowledges as correct. It is also the first step to Gretchen proving that B* being psychologically continuous with A* does not imply that they are the same person.
The conversation then moves to the idea of identity being related to psychological continuity, which is essentially memories caused in the correct way. Miller attempts to fix his shattered idea by saying real memories can only be those had by the same person who remembers the experience. This means the memories must be caused in the right way, instead of simply being something a person seems to remember. People who seem to remember being a world leader, but actually were not, can then be excluded from the memory argument because their memories are not based off of actual experience that they had. This means that a heavenly being, far into the future, who has memories of events you were a part of that developed on Earth which were also caused in the right way would be you. The stronger argument arises in Gretchen’s response to this idea, saying that if this heavenly being could be created in the future, more than one of these could also be created. Specifically relating to God, she mentions that if God is in fact the creator of this future Gretchen, then someone as all-powerful as He could easily add additional Gretchen’s to this heavenly world. By the transitive property, if Gretchen Today is equal to Gretchen One of the future, and also identical to Gretchen Two of the future, Gretchen One must be identical to Gretchen Two. This is not a possibility, as there cannot be two or more people with the same identity at the same time. Again, Miller tries to make his argument more specific, adding that if there is no competition, meaning there is only one of these future Gretchen’s created, then A* and B* can be the same person if B* remembers A* where the memories were created in the right way. To this point, Gretchen does not have a definitive answer, instead saying that a pile of absurdities such as the ones Miller is providing is equal to a contradiction. While if all those rules were followed, that technically would be your identity in the future, why should these specifications work for one person created in the future if they cannot work for two people, who could just as easily come about in the future. Additionally, if competition was not an issue, you could die simply by the creation of another heavenly you, meaning your identity would be the result of happenings that were not in your control. You not being in control of your own identity is another absurdity which contributes to Gretchen’s disbelieving opinion of the psychological continuity as an explanation of identity hypothesis. As Gretchen never fully disproves the final theory with all parts included, instead explaining why this option is absurd, this theory is the stronger of the two during the second night. This being said, Gretchen skillfully combats all points thrown at her, and explains why the idea of no competition, while not impossible, does not make any sense. This is enough to show that physiological continuity is not the same as identity.
Gretchen successfully refutes all theories brought up on the second night regarding memory and psychological continuity relating to identity. Her example of false memories, following the thought that memories are what connect a person to their past selves and therefore, their identity, is a strong reply. When Miller makes further distinctions, such as the memories needing to be caused in the correct way, she again has a worthy argument, speaking of duplicates and the impossibilities surrounding them. Finally, the nonsensical factors surrounding the previous two ideas plus a lack of competition are addressed and mostly agreed on by all parties involved, proving that psychological continuity without competition, while not impossible, has so many inconsistencies that it is essentially proven to be false.
The weaker argument of the second night is an unsuccessful attempt at demonstrating the relationship between memory and identity. The second night opens with Miller bringing up the idea that when you wake up in the morning, you know who you are without the assistance of an image of your body. It is not necessary for you to even open your eyes, as you can figure out who you are based off of memory. From this, we can deduce that A* and B* are the same person if B* remembers A*. The different stages of a person life are then connected by memory, or by being part of a continuous stream of consciousness. A person may not remember what they did forty days ago, but they certainly remember what they did yesterday. Their yesterday self then remembers the previous day quite well and so on, until we reach forty days in the past. These memories would then connect different points in a person’s life, and therefore connect the identity of the person. To illustrate this, Miller addresses an example of a river, which as a whole has a specific name, but constantly has different water flowing through it. This river can always be acknowledged as a certain name because the water all connects to each other. In other words, the water that flows through the river currently relates to the water seen yesterday because it is connected to water which is eventually connected to the water you witnessed in the past. While these arguments seem strong and well stated, Gretchen swiftly disproves them by citing the difference between remembering something and seeming to remember something. There are several instances in our world where a person believes that they remember a specific event, but they could not actually remember that event because it never occurred to them. A hypnotist show is one instance where this could happen, as volunteers at these shows believe they are different people than they actually are, such as a small child or a world leader. Merely remembering yourself as a world leader is not sufficient to make yourself a world leader, and according to Gretchen, a memory itself is not enough to determine identity. She is undoubtable correct, considering the many instances of people who remember events which did not happen to them, and therefore could not possibly make up their identity. This argument is the weaker one of the night, considering it is successfully refuted in a way everyone acknowledges as correct. It is also the first step to Gretchen proving that B* being psychologically continuous with A* does not imply that they are the same person.
The conversation then moves to the idea of identity being related to psychological continuity, which is essentially memories caused in the correct way. Miller attempts to fix his shattered idea by saying real memories can only be those had by the same person who remembers the experience. This means the memories must be caused in the right way, instead of simply being something a person seems to remember. People who seem to remember being a world leader, but actually were not, can then be excluded from the memory argument because their memories are not based off of actual experience that they had. This means that a heavenly being, far into the future, who has memories of events you were a part of that developed on Earth which were also caused in the right way would be you. The stronger argument arises in Gretchen’s response to this idea, saying that if this heavenly being could be created in the future, more than one of these could also be created. Specifically relating to God, she mentions that if God is in fact the creator of this future Gretchen, then someone as all-powerful as He could easily add additional Gretchen’s to this heavenly world. By the transitive property, if Gretchen Today is equal to Gretchen One of the future, and also identical to Gretchen Two of the future, Gretchen One must be identical to Gretchen Two. This is not a possibility, as there cannot be two or more people with the same identity at the same time. Again, Miller tries to make his argument more specific, adding that if there is no competition, meaning there is only one of these future Gretchen’s created, then A* and B* can be the same person if B* remembers A* where the memories were created in the right way. To this point, Gretchen does not have a definitive answer, instead saying that a pile of absurdities such as the ones Miller is providing is equal to a contradiction. While if all those rules were followed, that technically would be your identity in the future, why should these specifications work for one person created in the future if they cannot work for two people, who could just as easily come about in the future. Additionally, if competition was not an issue, you could die simply by the creation of another heavenly you, meaning your identity would be the result of happenings that were not in your control. You not being in control of your own identity is another absurdity which contributes to Gretchen’s disbelieving opinion of the psychological continuity as an explanation of identity hypothesis. As Gretchen never fully disproves the final theory with all parts included, instead explaining why this option is absurd, this theory is the stronger of the two during the second night. This being said, Gretchen skillfully combats all points thrown at her, and explains why the idea of no competition, while not impossible, does not make any sense. This is enough to show that physiological continuity is not the same as identity.
Gretchen successfully refutes all theories brought up on the second night regarding memory and psychological continuity relating to identity. Her example of false memories, following the thought that memories are what connect a person to their past selves and therefore, their identity, is a strong reply. When Miller makes further distinctions, such as the memories needing to be caused in the correct way, she again has a worthy argument, speaking of duplicates and the impossibilities surrounding them. Finally, the nonsensical factors surrounding the previous two ideas plus a lack of competition are addressed and mostly agreed on by all parties involved, proving that psychological continuity without competition, while not impossible, has so many inconsistencies that it is essentially proven to be false.